Biographia Literaria; or, Biographical Sketches of My Literary Life and Opinions

I will not be suspected of a design to inflate into a system the loose and vague expressions of common discourse. The Definitions which I have to offer may be briefly stated and may perhaps appear paradoxical; but they are grounded on a principle of philosophical analysis of the mental faculties, and will, I hope, receive confirmation from the phenomena of the poetic mind.

By Imagination I understand the living power and prime agent of all human perception, and as applicable to the visible, so to the invisible world. It may be called the soul of all things, by which alone they are known and made; for without it the objects presented to the senses would be as though they were not. Imagination is the repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act of creation in the infinite I AM.

I distinguish between two kinds or operations of Imagination; the primary, by which we perceive or conceive the unity of the manifold in sense, and the secondary, by which the mind shapes and modifies its perceptions according to forms not originally present. The primary Imagination is the living power and prime agent of all human perception, and as a repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act of creation it is coextensive with the faculties of perception themselves.

The secondary Imagination I consider as an echo of the former, co-existing with the conscious will, yet differing from the mere Fancy in degree and dignity. The secondary dissolves, diffuses, dissipates, in order to re-create; it is essentially vital and akin to the primary, though subordinate and derivative.

Fancy, on the other hand, has no other countersign than the mechanical and aggregative tendency of the mind. It has power to juxtapose and arrange ideas, but not to vivify them; it obeys the will, and is distinguished by rapidity, facility, and casualness. Fancy accumulates and superadds, but does not vitalize by fusion: it is associative where the Imagination is creative.

The distinction in effect is this: Imagination is the presence of the whole in the part, the apprehension of identity in difference; Fancy is a power of fixation, arrangement, and ornament. Imagination, in its highest exercise, is essentially paradoxical, reconciling opposites into a new and living synthesis; Fancy, in its operation, is essentially additive and decorative.

It follows from these distinctions, that poetic genius depends on Imagination, and that poetic beauty arises from the reconciliation of opposites by a living synthesis. The merely fanciful writer may please by ingenuity and ornament, but he cannot produce the primary effect of poetry — that of giving life and unity to manifold impressions.

In the exercise of criticism, therefore, it is an error to confound Fancy with Imagination, and the misunderstandings which have arisen from such confusion have been fertile sources of fallacy. Many writers, and some philosophers, have assigned to Fancy the functions which belong properly to the Imagination; while others have denied to Imagination the title to any specific, objective reality.

I must add, that in drawing these lines I do not intend to disenfranchise Fancy from its uses and legitimate province. Fancy may be awkwardly applied and may produce mere caprice, but it has its value in ornament, illustration, and the play of wit. The proper critic will appreciate both powers in their station, and will remember that the highest forms of poetry owe their existence to the predominance of Imagination.